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COMMENTS
FROM NIKE V. KASKY TO MARTHA
STEWART: FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION FOR CORPORATE
SPEAKERS' DENIALS OF PUBLIC
CRIMINAL ALLEGATIONS
CYNTHIA A. CAILLAVET*

I. INTRODUCTION

Richard Epstein once said that "[i]t is difficult to conceive of ... a
defense of freedom of speech so pure as to countenance securities fraud...
. ' The regulation of false or misleading statements of material fact under
the securities laws, 2 like other regulations of false or misleading
commercial speech, has been upheld under First Amendment analysis,
despite the fact that such regulations necessarily curtail speech. This rubric
is problematic, however, when applied to certain types of corporate speech
that have become prevalent in today's climate of overlapping legal,
political, social, economic, and popular culture.
* J.D. Candidate 2005, Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to thank
Elisa Hughes and the entire JCLC editorial staff, my family and friends for their support
during this process, and Cara Johnston for her thorough review and insightful
recommendations.
I Richard Epstein, UnconstitutionalConditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59 (1988) (describing the state police power as the power "to override
explicit constitutional guarantees when necessary to protect other persons from the threat or
use of force or fraud").
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2004).
3 SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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In particular, as highly publicized allegations of corporate criminal
wrongdoing are becoming more and more common, a lively public debate,
fueled by the news media, has developed regarding the guilt and innocence
of "corporate celebrities." Corporate criminal allegations have incited an
upsurge in a form of advertising known as the corporate image campaign,
which focuses not on the products or services a company offers, but on
improving the public image of the corporation itself.4 However, public
denials of criminal allegations seemingly transcend categorization as mere
corporate image campaigning. Where the speech of a commercial entity is
a denial of criminal allegations, such speech should be more protected than
typical low-value "commercial speech," like product advertising.
Both Martha Stewart and the Nike corporation have become embroiled
in legal battles stemming from their potential liability for public statements
made to defend against highly publicized allegations of criminal
wrongdoing.5 Potential liability in each case (securities fraud against
Stewart and false advertising against Nike) stems from the fact that the
commercial entity's denials may have affected the public's view of the
corporation's business such that the speech has been categorized as lesser
protected "commercial speech.",6 These two distinct corporate personalities
and the analogous legal difficulties they have encountered suggest that a
burgeoning class of corporate defendants may require application of unique
judicial rules to avoid liability for statements merely denying public
allegations of criminal wrongdoing. So long as the current trend toward
highly publicized white collar criminal prosecutions continues, this class of
corporate defendants dwelling in the public eye will require some
protection. Regulations directed at curbing misleading commercial speech,
such as securities fraud regulations and false advertising laws, for example,
must be revisited to protect corporations' and corporate personalities' First
Amendment speech right, a right that should be at its peak when speech is
offered in defense of allegations of criminal wrongdoing.
Policy considerations favor some form of unique treatment for
corporate entities facing highly publicized criminal allegations. When
corporate entities face civil liability (or even criminal conviction) for their
denials of public criminal allegations, speech at the heart of the First
Amendment is chilled. In particular, a commercial entity's interest in selfexpression is curtailed, and a valuable check on government overreach is
See generally Laura Lin, Note, CorporateImage Advertising and the FirstAmendment,
61 S.CAL. L. REV. 459 (1988).
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003); United States v. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d
461 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
6 See, e.g., Nike, 539 U.S. at 657.
4
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circumvented. Moreover, by not permitting any response, the regulations
on corporate speech may be unwittingly expressive on their own; silence in
the face of criminal allegations may implicitly signal to the public a
corporate entity's guilt or, at least, acceptance of the charges against them.
Corporate entities and the investing and consuming public have strong
interests in allowing the fullest dialogue possible on issues of corporate
criminality. And because the government has available more narrowly
tailored means of addressing problematic false statements made during the
course of a criminal investigation and trial, such regulations of speech
should not be permissible under the First Amendment.
This Comment proposes a narrow exception to the current doctrine
regarding the low First Amendment protection for false or misleading
commercial speech: commercial speakers whose speech rebuts public
claims of criminal wrongdoing should not be held liable for claims
stemming from the factual content of their denials, even if false or
misleading. The basis for this exception is two-fold: that such speech is
not in fact commercial and is thus afforded constitutional protection from
rigorous regulation;7 and that the right of a criminal defendant or accused to
deny the allegations against him or her (and to buttress their denial with
"modest factual claims") 8 outweighs the interest that the state has in
regulating this narrow class of speech.
This Comment offers an initial review of the Nike and Martha Stewart
cases (Part 1I) before addressing the current First Amendment jurisprudence
(Part II.A), particularly as it pertains to commercial speech (Part III.B) and
false and misleading speech (Part III.C). This Comment then argues that a
commercial entity's public denial of criminal accusations does not
constitute commercial speech (Part IV.A); that commercial entities and
society each have strong interests in protecting public denials (Part IV.B);
that the government interest in regulating such speech is low (Part IV.C);
and, therefore, that regulation of such speech violates the First Amendment
right of corporate speakers. Thus, this Comment concludes that a corporate
entity should not be subject to liability stemming from the denial of public
allegations of criminal wrongdoing, even if the denial is false or misleading.
' The United States Supreme Court has held that the imposition of either criminal
sanction or civil liability in a private action based on speech constitutes government
regulation of speech for the purpose of First Amendment analysis. See, e.g., City of Houston
v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (invalidating on First Amendment overbreadth grounds a city
ordinance making it illegal to oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt a police officer); N.Y.
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (finding imposition of civil liability to be speech
regulation).
8 Warren L. Dennis & Bruce Boyden, Stewart Prosecution Imperils Business Civil
Liberties, 18 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER No. 14, Oct. 3, 2003, at 3.
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AND UNITED STATES V. STEWART

The Nike corporation recently challenged its potential liability for
statements made to defend against and rebut public allegations of human
rights violations in its foreign factories. 9 Starting in 1996, Nike, a popular
sporting goods company, was "besieged with a series of allegations that it
was mistreating and underpaying workers at foreign facilities.'"
In
response to these public allegations, Nike sent press releases, wrote letters
to the media and individuals (such as university officials), and
commissioned a report on the conditions of Nike's foreign facilities,
denying and discrediting the public allegations." Based on these public
denials, a California resident sued Nike under California's Unfair
Competition Law and False Advertising Law, 2 alleging that Nike made
false public statements and omitted facts regarding poor working conditions
in order to "maintain and/or increase its sales."' 3 The trial court dismissed4
the suit on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, on motion by Nike.'
The California Court of Appeals affirmed, but the California Supreme
Court reversed and remanded on the ground that Nike's commercial speech
is not afforded substantial First Amendment protection. 5 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address two issues: (1) whether
corporate speech as part of a public debate can be the basis of liability for
factual inaccuracies, because such speech may affect consumer opinions of
the business as a "good corporate citizen" and thus may be characterized as
commercial speech; and (2) whether, assuming such speech is commercial,
the First Amendment permits the regulation of Nike's speech.' 6 However,
9 Nike, 539 U.S. at 654.
10 Id.
" Nike was responding to allegations that:
workers in Nike's production facilities were forced to work overtime, often without overtime
pay, and to work excessive overtime, in violation of local laws; were in some cases paid less than
the applicable minimum wage; were subjected to physical punishments and abuse; and were
exposed to reproductive toxins and other harmful chemicals in the solvents and glue used in the
production of Nike's shoes, as well as excessive heat, dust, and noise, without adequate safety
equipment, in violation of local laws.
Brief for Respondent at 3-4, Nike (No. 02-575) (internal citations omitted).
12 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210, 17500-17509 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004)

(defining "unfair competition" as including "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act
or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising"). A claim under this act
can be brought by any citizen of California, as was done by Kasky, acting as a pseudoAttorney General.
3 Nike, 539 U.S. at 656.
14 id.

Id. at 657.
16id.
'"
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because the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted, I" the issue has not been finally resolved.
Even more troubling is the securities fraud case recently brought
against Martha Stewart, home-making maven, chief executive officer,'" and
chairman of the board of directors 9 of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia
(MSLO).20 In June of 2002, Stewart faced an onslaught of public interest
and media coverage regarding her potential involvement in an insider
trading scandal. 2' On December 27, 2001, Stewart sold her 3,928 shares of
ImClone Systems Incorporated, a medicine developer.
Stewart was
widely and publicly accused of selling her shares based on her alleged
receipt of nonpublic information the day before the FDA announced its
refusal to license Erbitux, ImClone's lead medicinal development,23 though
no formal charges of insider trading had been brought (and never were
brought) against Stewart.2 4 The story of Stewart's involvement with the
ImClone scandal was published in both the Associated Press and the New
York Times, relying on statements from "people close to a Congressional
investigation., 2 5 Less than a week later, a Congressman professed to a
national television audience his belief that Stewart was guilty of insider

17 id.

Stewart is now the former chief executive officer of MSLO, since she resigned from
this position during the course of the events described.
19 Interestingly, another "hat" that Stewart once wore was that of securities broker. She
was employed as such from approximately 1968-1975. Indictment at 2, United States v.
Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 03 Crim. 717) [hereinafter Stewart
Indictment].
20 MSLO is a corporation engaged in the business of television production, magazine and
book publication, and merchandising and sale of "Martha Stewart" products. Id. at 1.
21 David Teather, MarthaStewart. Goose Still Cooking, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Sept. 13,
2002,
at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/ournalist/story/0,7792,791450,00.html
("Ambushed by a presenter on [CBS News's The Early Show] where she has a regular slot,
Ms. Stewart now famously remarked that she would rather 'focus on the salad' she was
making [than answer questions about her involvement with the ImClone scandal].").
22 Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 462.
23 Ironically, the FDA has since approved Erbitux for the treatment of certain types of
cancer. Martha's Defense Rests, CNN MONEY, Feb. 25, 2004, at http://money.cnn.com/
2004/02/25/news/companies/martha/index.htm.
24 Stewart's sale of ImClone stock prior to the FDA announcement saved her from a
financial loss of between S45,673 and $51,222, based on the decreased value of ImClone
stock on the day following the FDA announcement. Stewart Indictment, supra note 19, at 9.
While the insider trading charges never materialized, Stewart was subsequently charged with
obstruction ofjustice and securities fraud (addressed in detail below).
25 E.g., Andrew Pollack, Martha Stewart Said to Sell Shares Before F.D.A. Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES LATE EDITION, June 7, 2002, at C4.
18
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trading. 26 Stewart's potential involvement made repeated national and
international headlines in the weeks and months to follow. 2 7 The public
allegations of Stewart's involvement took a toll on the value of MSLO
common stock, which fell from $19.01 per share (at closing on June 6,
2002, immediately prior to the report of Stewart's ImClone connection) to
$11.47 per share on June 28, 2002.28
The media reported that a vacationing Stewart had received a
telephone message from her broker at Merrill Lynch that stated, "Peter
Bacanovic thinks ImClone is going to start trading downward."2 9 Stewart
returned the call and learned that Sam Waksal, the CEO of ImClone, and
his family were selling their very substantial shares of ImClone stock.3 °
Based on this nonpublic information, Stewart allegedly ordered the sale of
her own ImClone stock, saving herself from an 18% loss of value after the
FDA's rejection of Erbitux on December 28, 2001. 3 1 In several public
statements in June 2002, Stewart denied this version of events and claimed
instead that she had prearranged with her broker an order to sell when her
ImClone stock dropped in value to less than $60 per share.32 That
arrangement, Stewart maintained, was the reason for her sale of ImClone
stock on December 27, 2001.33 Following each of Stewart's public denials,
the value of MSLO stock increased.34 Based on the increases, allegedly
prompted by Stewart's denials, Martha Stewart was charged with securities
fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 240.10b-5, 35 for
26 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29
at 11, Stewart (No. 03 Crim. 717), available at http://www.marthatalks.com/trial update/
022304.html [hereinafter Motion for Judgment of Acquittal] (the individual who made this
statement was Congressman Jim Greenwood (R-Pa.)).
27 See, e.g., Martha Stewart Broker Suspended, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, June 22,

2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2059953.stm; More Miseryfor Martha Stewart,
CBS NEWS, June 24, 2002, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/06/25/national/
main5t3291.shtml; Betsy Stark, Martha's Mess: ImClone Inquiry Casting Cloud over
Martha

Stewart's

Business,

ABC

NEWS,

June

17,

2002,

available

at

http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/business/worldnewstonight/stark-marthastewart.html.
28 Stewart Indictment, supra note 19, at 36.
29 Id.at 7.
30 Id.at 7-8.
3' Id.at 8.
32 See More Misery for Martha Stewart, supra note 27 ("Stewart has said that her trade
was legal and based on a previously arranged 'stop-loss order' to sell the stock if it dipped
below 60.").

33 Stewart Indictment, supra note 19, at 37-40.
34 id.

" 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (2004):
Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
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publishing "a series of false and misleading public statements during June
2002 regarding her sale of ImClone stock" in "an effort to stop or at least
slow the steady erosion of MSLO's stock price caused by investor
concerns" (hereinafter, Count Nine).36 The criminal case against Stewart
went to trial.37
Significantly, prior to trial Stewart moved to dismiss Count Nine based
on a First Amendment defense, among others.3" While admitting that
Count Nine was a novel approach to the securities laws, the court did not
dismiss Count Nine and later held that Stewart could not argue at trial the
potential First Amendment problem posed by Count Nine. 39 Rather, the
court ruled as a matter of law that Count Nine poses no First Amendment

or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a materialfact or to omit to state a
materialfact necessary in orderto make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.

Id. (emphasis added). Volatility in stock price is considered an indicator of the materiality of
an alleged misstatement.
36 Stewart Indictment, supra note 19, at 36. The indictment against Stewart posits that
Stewart's reputation was so critical to the success or failure of her company that false or
misleading statements about her personal sale of ImClone stock would have an impact on the
value of MSLO shares. Id. at 35. Further, the indictment states that Stewart was very aware
of her company's reliance on the Martha Stewart image. Id. ("In MSLO's 1999 prospectus
the company stated, 'Our continued success and the value of our brand name therefore
depends, to a large degree, on the reputation of Martha Stewart."').
37 Opening statements were given on January 27, 2004. See Martha's Lawyer Blasts
'Guesswork', CNN MONEY, Jan. 27, 2004, at http://money.cnn.com/2004/0l/27/news/
companies/martha openings/index.htm; Associated Press, Prosecutor: Stewart Had Tip No
One Else Had, CNN, Jan. 27, 2004, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/01/27/
martha.stewart.ap/index.html [hereinafter Stewart Had Tip].
38 Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Martha Stewart's Omnibus Pre-Trial
Motions at 10, United States v. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 03
Crim. 717) (Nov. 14, 2003), available at http://www.marthatalks.com/trial update/
111403.html:
Yet under the regime urged by the government, it may indict adefendant, then indict her again
for publicly challenging the first indictment. That is frightening. Count Nine is so far beyond
our constitutional tradition that the government failed to find any case in the history of this
country in which a person was prosecuted for asserting, explaining, or expressing her own
innocence. We hope this will not be the first.
Id.

39 United States v. Stewart, No,03 Crim. 717, 2004 WL 113506, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26,
2004) (granting government's motion in limine to preclude Stewart from arguing in opening
statement or presenting evidence at trial tending to show that her prosecution stems from a
claim of innocence in violation of the First Amendment).

1040

CYNTHIA CAILLA VET

[Vol. 94

problem because "the First Amendment does not protect false statements of
fact that are part of a course of criminal conduct. '4°
Following presentation of evidence, Stewart filed a motion to acquit on
Count Nine based on insufficiency of the evidence, under Rule 29 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 4' After weeks of trial, the court
ultimately determined that the evidence presented was insufficient to
support a finding of guilt on Count Nine and granted Stewart's motion for
acquittal. 42 Specifically, the court held that the Government had not proved
with sufficient evidence that Stewart had the requisite criminal intent to
deceive investors and artificially inflate her stock price by making the
statements for which she was charged with securities fraud.43 In other
words, to reach a conclusion of criminal guilt on Count Nine, the jury
would have to impermissibly speculate about Stewart's intent.44
The court's decision, however, turned on the high burden that the
Government faces in proving the elements of the criminal offense of
securities fraud beyond a reasonable doubt.4 ' The court suggested that the
evidence presented would have been sufficient to withstand a motion for
judgment as a matter of law (and thus would go to the jury) if the charges
were civil rather than criminal. The court stated:
This is one of those rare cases in which the standard of proof makes a difference in the
assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence. The Government argues, in effect, that
evidentiary sufficiency is the same in civil and criminal securities fraud cases.
However, the law is to the contrary.... The issue at hand is... whether, taking into
account the heightened standard of proof in criminal cases, there is sufficient
evidence
46
of Stewart's intent to deceive investors to present the matter to the jury.

The court concluded that the evidence against Stewart was insufficient
to meet this heightened standard, implicitly leaving open the possibility of
civil liability. Thus, while the court found that the evidence against Stewart
regarding her statements of innocence was insufficient to support a
40

ld.; see also Stewart Had Tip, supra note 37 ("Even before opening statements began,

[Judge] Cedarbaum dealt Stewart a setback Monday. Cedarbaum said Stewart's defense
could not argue that she is being prosecuted merely for claiming she was innocent.");
Martha's Defense Rests, supra note 23.
41 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, supra note 26.
42 United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). After a five week
trial, a jury subsequently found Stewart guilty of conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and
making false statements to authorities. Martha Stewart Found Guilty on All Counts, CNN,
Mar. 6, 2004, at http://www.cnn.con2004/LAW/03/O5/stewart.main/index.htm.
She is
currently serving a five-month sentence at a minimum security facility.
4 Id. at 378.
44 Id. at 370.
4 Id. at 369-70.
46

Id. at 369.
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conviction for securities fraud, Stewart could, under the court's reasoning,
be civilly liable under the securities laws for her false or misleading
criminal denials.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Essentially underlying Epstein's comment 47 is the Supreme Court's
historic reluctance to apply the First Amendment as an absolute protection
of speech, in spite of the absolute language of the free speech provision.4
The Court has allowed regulation of lesser valued types of speech,49 while
creating the strongest protections for speech the Court has deemed essential
for a functioning democratic society.50 Highly protected speech includes
speech on matters of public importance, such as political,5 ' social,52 or
religious 5 3 speech. Regulations of high-value speech must survive strict
constitutional scrutiny, because such speech fosters the main theoretical
54
goals of speech protection; high-value speech aids the democratic process,

contributes to a "marketplace of ideas,"55 and furthers individual citizen

47 Epstein, supra note 1, at 59.
48 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech ....
). The First Amendment has been applied to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
49 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
50See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
51 Id.
52 See, e.g., Nationalist Socialist Party ofAm. v. Skokie, 434 U.S. 1327 (1977).

53 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
54 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION To SELF-GOVERNMENT 24-

27 (1948) (positing that freedom of speech ought to allow for informed decision-making by
citizens and that restrictions on information relating to a public decision are "mutilation[s] of
the thinking process of the community against which the First Amendment is directed").
Another version of the democracy rationale views public opinion as a check on overreaching
official action. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory,
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527-542 (1977) ("Under [this] view of democracy, the role of the
ordinary citizen is not so much to contribute on a continuing basis to the formation of public
policy as to retain a veto power to be employed when the decisions of officials pass certain
bounds.").
55 The marketplace of ideas theory was first articulated in JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY (1959); see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (relying on the marketplace of ideas rationale for First Amendment protection,
stating that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas.., the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market ...
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autonomy. 56 Speech on issues of public importance is highly protected."
Such speech may include political speech,58 expression of ideas,' 9 or even a
broad category of speech on issues "about which information is needed or
appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of
their period." 6 Stated less academically and more realistically, any speech
that tends to preoccupy the public, either via the news media or other
medium of public opinion, should be considered speech that the public
deems important.
On the opposite end of the First Amendment spectrum, types of speech
receiving low or no protection include threats,6 1 speech that intentionally
64
63
62
incites imminent violence, so called "fighting words,

and obscenity.

B. PROTECTION AFFORDED COMMERCIAL SPEECH

Commercial speech, though, falls in the middle of the First
Amendment spectrum, such that some form of intermediate scrutiny
applies. 65 A lively case history has evolved regarding the definition of

commercial speech and the type of protection afforded to commercial
speakers.
Historically, commercial speech was viewed as entirely
unprotected by the First Amendment.66 For example, in Valentine v.
Chrestensen, the Court held that a handbill containing a commercial
advertisement was unprotected speech merely because of the commercial
56

T.M. Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 213-218

(1972) ("[In order to] regard himself as autonomous [a] person must see himself as sovereign
in deciding what to believe and in weighing competing reasons for action. . . . [An]
autonomous person cannot accept without independent consideration the judgment of others
as to what he should believe or what he should do."). Scanlon later hedges a bit his initially
broad theory, suggesting that "it is hard to see how laws against deceptive advertising
[could] be squared with this [sweeping] principle." T.M. Scanlon, Freedom of Expression
and Categories ofExpression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519, 532-533 (1979).
57 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (distinguishing speech on matters of
public importance from commercial advertising).
58 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35-59 (1976).
59 See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (stating that the "right to
receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth is fundamental to our free
society").
60 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967)).
61 Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002).
62 Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
63 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
64 Miller v. California, 418 U.S. 915 (1974).
65 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n ofN.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
66 Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942).
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content.67 Then in a series of opinions in the 1960s and 1970s, the Court
recognized that speech cannot be entirely denied First Amendment
protection because the speech is "on a commercial subject., 68 However, the
First Amendment protection afforded commercial speech continues to be
less than the protection of other more valued speech.
1. Policy behind limitedprotectionfor commercialspeech
Essentially three rationales have been offered for the lowered level of
protection for commercial speech: the hardiness of commercial speech, the
low contribution of commercial speech to the forum of ideas, and a
heightened need and capability to ensure accuracy of commercial speech.69
First of all, because commercial speech serves an economic interest, such
speech is seen as hardy and not likely to be crushed by overbroad
regulation. 7 ° Because commercial messages are generally calculated,
regulations of commercial speech also do not inhibit spontaneous speech,
which is viewed as more likely to be chilled.7'
Also, the Court views commercial speech and, in particular,
advertising as contributing less to the interchange of ideas and thus less
likely to foster intense media scrutiny or discussion. Commercial speech
contributes not to the interchange of ideas, but to "private economic
decision making and public allocation of resources. 7 2 Because of its low
value as a contributor to the forum of ideas, commercial speech is more
fitting for intense regulation. 73 The Court has attempted to draw a bright
line between commercial and noncommercial speech out of fear that the
low protection of commercial speech would dilute the protection afforded
more high-value speech.74
67
68

316 U.S. at 54.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-

62(1976).
69 See Thomas W. Merrill, First Amendment ProtectionforCommercialAdvertising: The
New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. Ci. L. REV. 205, 223 (1976-77) (citing Va. State Bd.,
425 U.S. at 1834-34 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
70 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564; Brief for Respondent at 13, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539
U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575).
71 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
72 Merrill, supra note 69, at 226.
73 Id. at 225 (explaining that the Court has "posited an inverse relationship between the
value of speech and the permissible degree of regulation").
74 Bd. of Tr. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481 (1989) (citing Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)) ("To require a parity of constitutional
protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a
leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of
speech.").
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The fact that commercial speech is not part of the forum of ideas, or is
more economic than philosophical, heightens the government's interest in
accuracy because the limited potential for public discussion or scrutiny
suggests that false statements will not be weeded out and rejected in the
public marketplace.7 5 Because advertisements are viewed as uniquely
likely to deceive or confuse, content-based restrictions in the commercial
context are more permissible.76 Additionally, the topic of commercial
speech is generally goods and services, which are tangible and thus more
susceptible to empirical analysis."7 Commercial speakers also have the
opportunity to ensure accuracy because a commercial entity typically
engages in advance planning before making commercial speech (i.e., before
publishing an advertisement).7 8 Thus, because commercial speakers are in a
position to have high knowledge of their products or services and the
market, they are in a good position to evaluate and verify the accuracy of
their messages and should be held more accountable for any inaccuracies.7 9
2. Defining commercial speech
The Supreme Court has attempted to define less-protected commercial
speech on several occasions because the classification of speech as
commercial or noncommercial is a threshold issue in determining the
standard to be applied to regulations of speech.80 While the prototypical
commercial speech is product or service advertising, s the Court has held
that other representations by commercial entities, such as press releases and
public letters, also can constitute commercial speech."
The Court has
applied several standards for distinguishing commercial speech from
noncommercial speech based on content, and the four most prominent
standards are discussed here.

75 Brief for the Petitioners at 16, Nike (No. 02-575).
76

Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983) (citing Friedman v.

Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979)).
77 Merrill, supra note 69, at 223 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 780-81 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
78 id.
79 Brief for Respondent at 37, Nike (No. 02-575); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
so Bolger, 463 U.S. at 65-66.
S1 Id. at 66 (advertisements as mere "proposals to engage in commercial transactions").
82 See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 227 n.4, 228 (1988); see also Semco,
Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 112 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[S]peech need not closely resemble a
typical advertisement to be commercial.").
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a. Commercial speech does "no more than propose a commercial
transaction. ' 83
Most typically, commercial speech is defined as speech that does no
more than propose a commercial transaction and thus falls under a tradition
of government regulation.84 In fact, in Board of Trustees of the State
University of New York v. Fox, the Court stated clearly, succinctly, and
narrowly that whether speech "propose[s] a commercial transaction" is "the
test for identifying commercial speech. ' 5 The Court has described this
distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech as one of
"commonsense," 8 6 where commercial speech, intuitively, is speech "linked
inextricably to commercial activity. ' 7 The Court has also stated that
"speech that has a purpose above and beyond 'mere solicitation of
patronage' should be treated
differently" than speech merely proposing a
88
transaction.
commercial
b. Speech that furthers the speaker's economic interests or is promotional
in nature is commercial speech.
Similarly, the Court has defined commercial speech based on the
speaker's economic motivation or potential for economic gain.
Commercial speech has been defined as "expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.'8' 9
Similarly,
commercial speech has been defined as representations that are
promotional-statements that serve to benefit the speaker's economic
interests, by increasing sales, for example. 90 To emphasize, under this
standard the purpose of the speech must be solely economic in order to
afford the speech lesser First Amendment protection; speech is not rendered
83

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762

(1976) (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973)).
84 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978); see also United States
v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001).
85 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (citing Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 762) (emphasis added).
86 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56.
87 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979) (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456).
88 Id. at II n.10 (emphasis added) (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765 (1978); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975)).
89 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980) (emphasis added).
90 In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 n.32 (1978). This broad definition was used by the
Respondent in Nike to support limited protection for "representations ... that gave
consumers factual information to rely on in their purchasing decisions."
Brief for
Respondent at 29, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575).
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commercial by the fact that the speech serves, among other things, an
economic interest. 9 1
c. The Bolger test for commercial speech
Application of these "commonsense" and economic impact standards,
however, has proven more complicated. In particular, deciding which
standard to apply becomes murky where a commercial speaker speaks on an
issue of public concern. In that context, the two standards discussed thus
far yield contradictory results: statements on an issue of public debate,
where the issue is related to the business of a commercial speaker, may be
economically beneficial to the speaker despite the fact that the speech does
not in any way propose a commercial transaction or solicit patronage. 92
Perhaps because of the difficulty of categorizing expression of this type, the
Court articulated a three-part test for identifying commercial speech in
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.93 There, the Court concluded that
informational pamphlets published by the maker of Trojan condoms
discussing the benefits of condoms and the dangers of sexually transmitted
diseases were commercial speech.94 The Court so found based on the
presence of three factors "in combination": advertising format, explicit
product reference, and economic motivation.95 In Bolger, the speaker
conceded that the pamphlets were advertisements.96 Further, the pamphlets
contained numerous references to condoms, the speaker's product, and no
doubt encouraged the use of such prophylactics, thereby increasing the sales
of condoms made by Trojan, the market leader. 97 While the Court found
that neither of these factors was determinative in isolation, the three
elements combined to qualify the pamphlets as lesser protected commercial
speech. 98 Having met these three factors, the fact that the pamphlets also

91 In fact, the Court has stated that "some of our most valued forms of fully protected

speech are uttered for a profit." Bd. of Tr. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
482 (1989) (citing, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), for the proposition
that print news serves both an economic and informational purpose).
92 See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
530 (1980).
9' 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
9' Id. at 66-68.
95 Id. at 66-67; see also Brief for the Petitioners at 23, Nike (No. 02-575).
96 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66.
97 Id. at 66-67, 67 n. 13.
9' Id. at 66-67.
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contained speech on an issue of public importance was insufficient to
render the pamphlets noncommercial. 99
d. Speech with mixed commercial and noncommercial elements is
noncommercial speech.
Finally, the Court has stated that where commercial speech and "pure
speech" are "inextricably intertwined," the categorization of the speech
must turn on "the nature of the speech taken as a whole."' 0 Thus,
expression that serves a substantial noncommercial purpose but has an
incidental commercial effect may be considered noncommercial for the
purpose of analysis.1 ' This definition indicates that where commercial
statements by a commercial speaker also include speech on issues of public
importance, other interests may be served, rendering the speech
noncommercial. However, this rule, first articulated in Riley v. National
Federationof the Blind of North Carolina,Inc.,102 has thus far been applied
sparingly. Courts have rejected use of this definition to expand the
protection for commercial elements of speech where "[n]o law of man or of
nature makes it impossible" to separate the commercial and noncommercial
elements of the speech. 0 3 Where the commercial aspect of speech can be
expressed wholly independent of the noncommercial speech, and vice
versa, the Riley rule affords no heightened protection. 104
3. Some speech by a commercial entity is noncommercial.
A significant and foundational point (that bears repeating) is that the
limited protection of commercial speech hinges on an equally applicable
protection for noncommercial speech by a commercial entity. The Court
has recognized that speech by a commercial entity can be noncommercial
speech on an issue of public concern, which is deserving of protection
against over-regulation.' 5 For example, in Consolidated Edison Co. of
99 Id. at 68 ("We have made clear that advertising which 'links a product to a current
public debate' is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial
speech.") (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 563 n.5 (1980)).
1o Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988).
o01
See Bd. of Tr. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (finding

commercial and noncommercial speech not inextricably intertwined);
Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108 (6th Cir. 1995) (same).
'02 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
'' Bd. of Tr. of the State Univ. of N.Y., 492 U.S. at 474.
104

Semco, Inc. v.

Id.

1o See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.

530 (1980).
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New York v. Public Service Commission of New York, the Court held that a
utility company's billing inserts advocating the development and use of
nuclear power constituted high-value speech on a "controversial [issue] of
public policy.' ' 10 6 The Court struck down on First Amendment grounds a
ban on the inclusion of such inserts in utility company mailings. 10 7 In so
doing, the Court reiterated that commercial speakers are afforded First
Amendment protection and explicitly rejected the contention that the utility
10 8
company's speech was less protected based on the speaker's identity.
Commercial speech can be permissibly subject to strict regulation only
because the Court has recognized that a commercial entity can speak in a
non-commercial capacity on an issue of public interest and that such speech
is fully protected. 0 9 Thus, underlying the limited First Amendment
protection for commercial speech is the premise that there are other,
protected avenues of speech for corporate speakers.
4. Limited protection afforded commercial speech
Incidentally, despite the limited protection that commercial speech
receives, the Court has maintained that restrictions on commercial speech
cannot be applied haphazardly. Even where speech is deemed commercial,
the expression is entitled to "qualified but nonetheless substantial
protection."" 0 For example, in Bolger, the Court found the pamphlet on the
topic of condoms and venereal disease to be protected under the First
Amendment, despite its status as commercial speech."' The Court held that
the sweeping restriction on the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for
106

Id. at 544.

107 Id.

'0o

Id. at 533 ("[W]e [reject] the contention that a State may confine corporate speech to

specified issues.. . . 'The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing
the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association,
union, or individual."') (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777
(1978)); see also Oral Argument of Laurence H. Tribe, Esq. on Behalf of the Petitioners at
I1, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575) (referencing Consol. Edison Co.
of N. Y, Inc., 447 U.S. at 530, as an example of speech on a matter of public importance
upheld despite the speaker's economic interest: "[l]n that case ... the pamphlet is a detailed
set of statements about why nuclear power is safer, better, cheaper, and better for our
independence, and you know what, Con Ed had a nuclear power plant, Indian Point, they
clearly had an economic interest in promoting that view.").
'09 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) ("A company has the full
panoply of protections available to its direct comments on public issues, so there is no reason
for providing similar constitutional protection when such statements are made in the context
of commercial transactions.") (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
110 Id.

...
Id.at 75.
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contraceptives was not justified, such that even the limited protection
afforded commercial speech was infringed.) 2 Thus, "[t]he application
of... [a commercial speech restriction] must be examined carefully to
ensure that speech deserving of greater constitutional protection is not
inadvertently suppressed.""' 3 For this reason, the party seeking to uphold a
restriction on commercial speech must carry the burden of justifying the
restriction. 14 While the protection afforded commercial speech has been
limited to speech that is not false or misleading," 5 the fear that overregulation of commercial speech will chill high-value speech is equally
relevant in the context of regulations of false or misleading speech,
particularly in the context of corporate criminal denials.
C. FALSE OR MISLEADING SPEECH
The Supreme Court once stated that "there is no constitutional value in
false statements of fact."'" 6 Since then, however, the Court has hedged this
initially blanket statement. 117 The Court has struck down regulations
against false speech on matters of public concern to allow "breathing room"
for constitutionally protected speech."' So as not to curtail high-value
speech, "the Court has been willing to insulate even demonstrably false
speech from liability.""

9

Moreover, the Court has consistently referred back to the idea that
false statements should not be regulated by the government, but instead

112

Id.; see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993):

The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum
where ideas and information flourish .... [T]he general rule is that the speaker and the audience,
not the government, assess the value of the information presented. Thus, even a communication
that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First
Amendment.

Fane, 507 U.S. at 767.
113 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66.
114 Id. at

71 n.20 (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570).

" Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557.

1 l6Gertz

v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 664 (2003) ("The regulatory interest in protecting
market participants from being misled by [factual misstatements] is of the highest order.
That is why we have broadly (perhapsoverbroadly) stated that 'there is no constitutional
value in false statements of fact."') (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340) (emphasis added).
's Id. at 676 (Breyer, J.,dissenting) (stating that the Court's allowance of "breathing
space" potentially incorporates a protection for certain types of false and misleading speech)
(citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340; Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1967); N.Y. Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964)).
''9Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986).
117
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weeded out in the marketplace of ideas.' 20 Justice Holmes once stated that
"the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market., 1 2' This has time again been rearticulated in
various permutations by the Court, the most significant of which is the oft
repeated adage that "the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones."' 22
Under this theory, the government should not censor false statements, but
instead should allow the fullest protection of uninhibited speech so that
false statements can in time be countered and contradicted by other
(perhaps true) statements. ' The marketplace of ideas concept relies on an
assumption that the general public is sufficiently sophisticated to
distinguish falsities from truths, assuming that enough information is
available to them.
However, in presuming that Stewart's and Nike's denials were false or
misleading, whether the denials are classified as commercial or noncommercial speech becomes particularly significant to the analysis. Despite
the concerns occasionally expressed by some commentators, false or
misleading commercial speech has undoubtedly been subject to permissible
government regulation. 24 The regular standard applied to commercial
speech, articulated by the Court in CentralHudson Gas & Electric v. Public
Service Commission of New York, 2 does not even apply where commercial
speech is misleading. Harmful commercial activity does not become
immunized from regulation merely because speech is involved. 2 6 Thus, the
regulation of false or misleading commercial speech is generally seen as
permissible regulation of commercial harms; 127 however, false or
See MILL, supra note 55.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
122 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
123 Donald E. Lively, Securities Regulation and Freedom of the Press: Toward a
Marketplace of Ideas in the Marketplace of Investment, 60 WASH. L. REV. 843, 846 (1985)
("The first amendment contemplates not only that the public will be poorly informed but also
that the public may be misinformed and misled.").
124 The securities fraud laws are one example of such permissible regulation.
125 If commercial speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading, regulation must
directly advance a substantial government interest that could not be achieved through a more
limited restriction on speech (later limited by Bd. of Tr. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox,
493 U.S. 469 (1989)).
126 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
127 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993) ("[A]n
interest in preventing commercial harms ... is, of course, the typical reason why commercial
speech can be subject to greater regulation than noncommercial speech."); see also
Respondent's Brief for Respondent at 9, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 664 (2003) (No.
02-575) (stating that false and misleading commercial speech creates commercial harms that
can be regulated without offending the First Amendment) (citing Discovery Network, 507
U.S. at 410).
120

121
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misleading noncommercial speech, like speech on matters of public
concern, may be protected just as other high-value speech is protected. 128
To be clear, the State's interests in the regulation of certain
commercial speech is not to be understated, particularly where the
commercial speech is false or misleading. Regulation of such speech serves
as a protection for listeners, who have "little interest in receiving false,
misleading, or deceptive commercial information.' ' 129

Regulation of

commercial speech permits the government to ensure the presentation of
accurate product information to consumers and thorough corporate
disclosures to investors.
Of course, the counter-argument to such
government control is, again, that "to the extent that regulation makes
government the chief editor of information disseminated to investors ... the

regulatory structure seems more consonant with 'authoritative selection"'
than with
the core First Amendment value of a thriving marketplace of
0
ideas.

3

In noncommercial contexts, however, the Court has held that speech
on public issues requires 'breathing space'-potentially incorporating
certain false or misleading speech-in order to survive.' 3' For example, in
New York Times v. Sullivan,'32 the Court required a showing of actual
malice (a higher standard than the general defamation standard) in order to
punish a newspaper for the publication of false statements about public
figures. 33 Under this standard, certain false factual statements that do not
rise to the level of actual malice would be permitted in order to avoid
chilling important public speech.' 34 Because the Court viewed speech
regarding public figures as particularly in the public interest, the Court was
more willing to afford protection to such speech.' 35 Thus, where an
important interest is being served and the theoretical underpinnings of
speech protection are being advanced, false or misleading noncommercial
128

Noncommercial speech is seen as contributing to the marketplace of ideas, despite its

false, misleading, offensive, or politically incorrect message. See, e.g., Nat'l Socialist Party
of America v. Skokie, 434 U.S. 1327 (1977). But see N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
129 Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 432 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
130 Lively, supra note 123, at 846 (citing United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (1943), for the proposition that the First Amendment "presupposes that right
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any
kind of authoritative selection").
131Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 676 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
the writ as improvidently granted).
132 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
113 Id. at 272.
134 Id.
135

Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS: CORPORATE STATEMENTS OF DEFENSE, EVEN IF FALSE OR
MISLEADING, SHOULD BE PROTECTED FROM REGULATION BY THE FIRST
AMENDMENT.

Because a commercial entity's statements of defense cannot be
classified as commercial speech, and because the interests infringed by
regulations of such speech outweigh the government interests served,
corporate denials should be protected from regulation, even if false or

misleading.
A. MARTHA STEWART'S AND NIKE'S DENIALS 136 ARE NOT
COMMERCIAL SPEECH.

One major difficulty with the commercial speech doctrine, evidenced
by corporate criminal denials, is "the difficulty of drawing bright lines that
will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category.' ' 137 Corporate
public statements of defense are particularly difficult to categorize, yet
classification of such speech as either 1commercial
or non-commercial is
38
required under the current jurisprudence.
1. Identity as a commercial entity is insufficient to qualify speech as
commercial.
In classifying statements like those made by Martha Stewart and Nike
as either commercial or noncommercial, the fact that the speaker has a
corporate identity is not dispositive. The Court has stated that the identity
of the speaker is not relevant to determining whether speech is
commercial. 13 9 Thus, the fact that Nike and Martha Stewart are, or are
affiliated with, corporate entities does not make their speech necessarily
136

Obviously, while Stewart's and Nike's denials are analyzed similarly here, the

situations they faced and the statements they made were not identical. Nike was never
formally charged with the working conditions violations of which it was publicly accused in
its capacity as a corporation. Conversely, Martha Stewart was formally investigated for
insider trading in her capacity as an individual, though her standing as the public figurehead
of her corporation makes this distinction less determinative. Given these differences and the
liability exception this Comment proposes, Stewart should certainly have a First Amendment
defense to liability stemming from her statements of denial. Less obviously, but equally
included in the exception proposed here, Nike should also have a First Amendment defense
to statements of defense made in its corporate capacity.
137City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993).
138 See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
139First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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commercial.
Though counter-intuitive, not every statement by a
commercial speaker is commercial speech for the purpose of First
Amendment analysis. 40 Rather, commercial speech is defined solely by its
content.' 41 In particular, speech on a matter of public interest,
even if made
42
by a commercial speaker, is treated as non-commercial.
2. The content of Stewart's and Nike's public denials of criminal
wrongdoing is non-commercial.
Stewart's and Nike's denials should not be afforded lesser First
Amendment protection because their speech does not qualify as commercial
speech under any of the Court's four distinct definitions.
a. Stewart's and Nike's denials did not propose a commercial transaction
and were not motivated solely by economic interests.
The statements of defense made by Stewart and Nike cannot be
classified as commercial speech under the Court's first two definitions of
commercial speech. Neither Stewart's nor Nike's statements proposed a
commercial transaction, as required by the Court's test stated in Board of
Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox (hereinafter SUNY);
relatedly, the purpose of the denials cannot realistically be considered solely
economic. While statements need not resemble typical advertisements to be
considered commercial,143 the statements at issue here did not even
remotely invite commercial dealings. Instead, the statements were merely
factually informative regarding the actions of the corporate speakers and
were proffered as claims of innocence as part of a public debate on the
corporate speakers' criminality.
The Martha Stewart statements at issue consisted of Stewart's denial
of insider trading, her explanation of the sell order agreement between
herself and her broker, and her reiteration of prior statements. 44 Her
140

See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530,

544 (1980).
141 Id. at
142

538 n.5.
E.g., id. at 538.

Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 112 (6th Cir. 1995).
Stewart Indictment, supra note 19, at 37-40. The Indictment lists three categories of
statements made by Stewart from which the securities fraud charge stems. (I) On June 7,
2002, Stewart issued a statement through her attorney, published in the Wall Street Journal,
regarding her sale: "The sale was executed because Ms. Stewart had a predetermined price
at which she planned to sell the stock. That determination, made more than a month before
that trade, was to sell if the stock ever went less than $60." (2) On June 12, 2002, following
the arrest of Samuel Waksal, Stewart prepared and issued a public statement reiterating her
stop-loss agreement, stating that on December 27, 2001, she had returned a phone call from
'41
144
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statements did not in any way invite commercial dealings, as would be the
case if she had promoted specific products. Moreover, Stewart's statements
leading to Count Nine were not even "the typical stuff of securities fraud
actions: false statements about earnings, or revenue, new product lines, or
issuance of government licenses or approvals.' 4 5 Stewart merely spoke on
her own behalf, rather than on behalf of her corporation, in response to
publicly released criminal allegations against her.
Stewart's public
statements essentially stated, "I am innocent, your charges are false, here is
why."' 146 Stewart's purpose was merely to deny the public allegations and
to give her side of the story; if Stewart had any economic motivation, this
was secondary to clearing her own name. 147
Under the Court's
jurisprudence, if Stewart's speech had a purpose above and beyond "mere
solicitation of patronage"' 148 and was not solely motivated by the economic
interests of herself and the listening public, 149 her speech should not be
considered commercial for the purpose of First Amendment analysis merely
because she is a figurehead of a corporation.
Nike's statements 50 also did not propose a commercial transaction and
were not motivated solely by economic interests. Rather, Nike dedicated
the text of its statements and letters to refuting the allegations that Nike's
her broker regarding the fact that the price had fallen below $60, and assuring that her trade
had not been based on nonpublic information. In a statement on June 18, 2002, Stewart
referred back to her June 12 statement as her explanation for "what did happen" and further
stated that she had cooperated with the government to the best of her ability. (3) On June 19,
2002, Stewart read aloud her June 18 statement at a conference for securities analysts and
investors.
145 Dennis & Boyden, supra note 8, at 3.
146 Pre-trial Brief for Defendant at 10, United States v. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 03 Crim. 717).
147 See Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, supra note 26,
at 13 ("That statements
defending Ms. Stewart's innocence were made throughout that period is perfectly consistent
with an intent to protect her personal reputation from false accusations.").
148Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 n.10 (1979).
149 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980) (defining commercial speech as "expression related solely to the economic interests
of the speaker and its audience").
'5oThe Kasky complaint alleges that Nike made six false statements:
(I) that its products are manufactured in compliance with applicable local laws and regulations
governing wages and working hours; (2) that the average line-workers in the factories are paid
double the applicable local minimum wage; (3) that the workers receive free meals and health
care; (4) that Nike 'guarantee[s] a living-wage for all workers'; (5) that the workers are protected
from corporal punishment and abuse; (6) that working conditions in the factories are in
compliance with applicable local laws and regulations governing occupational health-and-safety
and environmental standards.
Brief for Respondent at 4-5, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575)
(citations and commentary omitted).
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overseas factories violated local laws and that the Nike corporation engaged
in human rights violations."' Typically, less-protected commercial speech
by Nike would be an "Air Jordan" television commercial; the statements
made by Nike in its defense are a far cry from mere advertisement, even of
its general corporate image. Instead, Nike's statements merely refute public
criminal allegations against the corporation.
Calling such speech
"commercial" would conflict with the Court's narrow definition of
52
commercial speech as speech merely proposing a commercial transaction.1
Additionally, a conceivable, and in fact likely, motivation for Nike's
statements was to refute the charges of illegality at its foreign. factories.
Nike may have merely wanted to have its voice heard as part of the ongoing
public debate regarding its mistreatment of foreign factory workers. As
such, the interest served by Nike's statements cannot be considered solely
economic. Thus, Nike's statements do not fall under either of the Court's
first two definitions of commercial speech.
b. Additionally, under the Bolger test, corporate denials are noncommercial
speech.
The statements by Stewart and Nike also do not qualify as commercial
speech under the three-part test articulated in Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products.'53 In Bolger, the Court held that speech constitutes commercial
speech, despite the inclusion of speech on matters of public importance,
where the speech (1) is an advertisement, (2) explicitly refers to the
speaker's product, and (3) is economically motivated. 54 Even presuming
some level of economic motivation for their denials, the statements offered
by Nike and Stewart were not advertisements and did not refer to their
products at all.
The Court has found that speech need not closely resemble a typical
advertisement to be commercial, such that press releases or public letters
can constitute commercial speech. 55 However, the Bolger test does rely on
the typical advertising format, in combination with the two other elements,
56
as a yardstick by which to gauge the commercial nature of speech.

151 Id.
152

See, e.g., Bd. of Tr. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 469 (1989).

"' 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
114 Id. at 66-67, 67 n.13.
155 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 227, 228 n.4 (1988); see also Semco, Inc. v.
Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 112 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Speech need not closely resemble a typical
advertisement to be commercial.").
156 Note that this is in direct contradiction to the aforementioned test. The Court has
been contradictory on this point.
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Stewart's and Nike's denials cannot be classified as typical advertisements.
In his dissenting opinion in Nike v. Kasky, Justice Breyer found relevant the
fact that Nike's statements "appear[ed] outside a traditional advertising
format, such as a brief television or newspaper advertisement."' 7 Rather,
Nike's statements were made in the form of various press releases, letters to
newspaper editors and certain individuals (such as university deans and
athletic directors)., 58 Similarly, Martha Stewart's denials were in the form
of press releases, direct comment to the Wall Street Journal, and a press
release read aloud by Stewart as a preface to her presentation on MSLO at
an investors' meeting.' 59 These are not the typical fora of advertisements; if
advertisement is defined broadly enough to encompass Nike's and
Stewart's statements under the Bolger test, commercial speech that
wouldn't constitute advertisement is difficult to imagine.
Further, neither Stewart nor Nike made reference to any of their
particular products in their statements of denial. 60 Stewart made no
reference to any of her company's magazines, household or crafts items, or
television programs. Nike's statements included no reference to specific
sporting goods, but instead focused on the conditions of its foreign
manufacturing facilities. Thus, even if Stewart and Nike had some
economic motivation for denying the criminal allegations against them,
their denials do not constitute commercial speech under the Bolger test.
c. Finally, even if part of Martha Stewart's and Nike's speech is
commercial, the commercial and noncommercial aspects are
inextricably intertwined, such that speech must be analyzed as
noncommercial.
In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, the
Court stated that, where commercial speech and "pure speech" are
"inextricably intertwined," such that the two categories of speech cannot be
separated, the speech must be analyzed as noncommercial. 6 ' This is a
narrow category, and courts have declined to apply this rule of analysis
where the commercial and noncommercial elements of the speech are at all
separable.1 62 However, in the context of corporate denials of criminal
157

Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 677 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

158Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159Stewart Indictment, supra note 19, at 37-40; see also supra note 144.
160 See supra notes 144 and 150 for the content of Stewart's and Nike's statements,
respectively.
161 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988).
162See, e.g., Bd. of Tr. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989);

Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 108 (6th Cir. 1995).
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allegations, the Riley rule should apply because the commercial and
noncommercial elements of the speech are in fact inextricably intertwined.
In SUNY, the Court upheld a restriction on the marketing of products in
campus dormitories and rejected the contention that the sale of housewares
was "inextricably intertwined" with noncommercial lessons in home
economics. 163 The Court stated that "[n]o law of man or nature makes it
impossible to sell housewares without teaching home economics, or to
teach home economics without selling housewares."' 64
The Court
recognized that the expression of noncommercial messages should not be
limited, but found that the noncommercial message at issue, a home
economics lesson, did not have to be combined with65 the commercial
message, the sale of housewares, in order to be conveyed.1
In Semco v. Amcast, the Sixth Circuit similarly rejected a Riley
contention, also offered in an attempt to heighten the protection for
commercial speech under a different set of facts. 1 6 6 In Semco, an article
published on the manufacturing process for "plunger tips" also contained
explicit references to the author company's products. 67 The Court held that
the two categories of speech were not inextricably intertwined, because an
article could feasibly discuss the manufacturing process without referring to
a particular brand of products; likewise, the particular brand 68could be
advertised independent of the manufacturing process publication.
However, the issue of corporate criminal denials is distinguishable
from the facts in both Semco and SUNY, and the Riley rule should be
applied here. If corporate denials have an element of commercial speech
because of their potential economic motivation and impact, this commercial
element is "inextricably intertwined" with the noncommercial element of
such speech, that of offering a denial to public criminal allegations. 69 Put
differently, here a "law of man or nature makes it impossible" to deny
allegations of corporate criminal wrongdoing without also making
statements potentially beneficial to the corporation's bottom line. Denial of
criminal allegations will most often have an economically beneficial effect
163

Bd. of Tr. of the State Univ. ofN.Y., 492 U.S. at 474.

164

Id.

165Id.

16652 F.3d 108 (6th Cir. 1995).
167 Id.
168 Id.

at 110-11.

at 113 (.'[N]o law of man or nature makes it impossible' to explain the new
process for manufacturing plunger tips without describing Amcast's own products, history,
quality standards, safety standards, and commitment to public services.").
169 Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988); see also Nike,
Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 677 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (accepting the "inextricably
intertwined" rationale on slightly different grounds).
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on the speaker when the speaker is in the business of profit-making.
Because of this catch-22, even if Nike's and Martha Stewart's statements
were motivated in part by a desire to promote their corporation or their
products,1 70 the Riley exception should apply in the narrow case of the
factual claims asserted as a criminal denial.
In his dissenting opinion in Nike v. Kasky, Justice Breyer17 1 found that
Nike's statements were not purely commercial.17 2 Rather, Breyer stated
that Nike's public statements, such as the letters written by Nike, are a
"mixture of commercial and noncommercial (public-issue-oriented)
elements"; he cited to Riley and concluded that the speech should receive
more protection than that afforded mere commercial speech. 173 Justice
Breyer cited three factors that were relevant to his determination that the
speech contained predominant noncommercial elements: the statements
were made outside the traditional advertising format; the statements
conveyed information to a diverse audience, including those with a mere
curiosity about the public controversy; and the content of the statements
clearly concerned a "matter .. .of significant public interest and active
controversy."'17 4 Again, the statements made by Stewart and Nike were not
published in the typical advertising format.17 5 The statements were made to
the general public via the media and to private individuals. Each of the
statements concerned a topic of heated debate and public curiosity. That
these criteria are met suggests that there is at least a noncommercial element
to their denials.
Practicality also supports the view that corporate denials are at least
partially noncommercial. If Martha Stewart's personal denial of criminal
170 While neither Nike nor Martha Stewart made direct reference to their corporations'
products in their public statements, "a company with sufficient control of the market for a
product may be able to promote the product without reference to its own brand names."
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983); see also Nat'l Comm'n. on Egg
Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977). This rationale almost certainly applies to
Nike, whose presence in the sporting goods market is undeniably significant. This rationale
may also extend to Stewart's identity as a spokesperson for her brand, because Stewart
arguably sells products by selling her own image. Thus, her own self-defense/selfpromotion may be seen as promoting her corporation, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia.
171With whom Justice O'Connor joined. Justice Kennedy also dissented from the
dismissal of the writ as improvidently granted.
172 539 U.S. 654, 676 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
'v Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 677 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also emphasized the difficulty with
the regulatory scheme for enforcement of the false advertising law in Nike v. Kasky and
acknowledged that a different context, like the securities laws, may be analyzed differently.
However, in assessing whether corporate criminal denials have a noncommercial element,
the factors Breyer outlined seem entirely applicable to the securities fraud context.
175 See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
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allegations and Nike's statements denying human rights and local law
violations are seen merely as commercial speech (with no noncommercial
element), one could hardly imagine a corporate denial of criminal
allegations that could avoid potential liability under restrictions on
commercial speech.
3. Regulation of corporatedenials is inconsistent with the rationales
offeredfor commercialspeech regulation.
Because the rationales offered for lesser protection of commercial
speech are inapplicable to commercial entities' statements of defense, as a
matter of policy such speech should not be afforded the lesser First
Amendment protection of typical commercial speech.
a. The government seeks to ensure the accuracy of statements to
consumers.
The government has a diminished interest in ensuring the accuracy of
speech like Nike's and Martha Stewart's denials, because the speech is on a
topic of contemporary public debate, rather than tangible goods and
services. 7 6 The government regulates the accuracy of commercial speech
because the accuracy of such speech is readily ascertainable by the speaker
and such speech is unlikely to fuel 7the
sort of debate that could self7
monitor, or weed out, false statements.
While the statements by Stewart and Nike did not pertain to tangible
goods and services, their accuracy was arguably readily ascertainable.
Their denials, of course, were not capable of the type of regulatory
empirical analysis that could ensure the accuracy of factual statements
about Air Jordans or 250-thread count bed sheets, but Stewart and Nike
both knew whether their statements of innocence were true or false.

For example, the allegations against Nike have fueled many protests over university
contracts with the Nike corporation on college campuses around the country. See, e.g., Craig
176

Anderson, Students Protest UA-Nike Contract, ARIZ. DAILY

WILDCAT,

Nov. 25, 1997,

availableat http://wildcat.arizona.edu/papers/91/65/Ol_l_m.html.
Even more so, the debate over Martha Stewart's involvement with the ImClone
scandal was widely promulgated by the news media and entertainment industry. Martha
Stewart was the butt of many jokes made by late-night television personalities, such as Jay
Leno, David Letterman, Jon Stewart, Conan O'Brien, Craig Kilbom, and Dennis Miller.
See, e.g., http://politicalhumor.about.com/library/blmarthastewartjokes.htm (Incidentally,
one of the better jokes, made by Conan O'Brien, was: "When reached for comment on the
charges, Martha didn't say much, (only) that a subpoena should be served with a nice
appetizer.").
177 Merrill, supra note 69, at 223.
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Admittedly, commercial speakers are in the best position to evaluate the
accuracy of their statements of innocence.
However, that a public debate regarding their guilt was ongoing
suggests that Stewart's and Nike's statements were different than mere
commercial advertising in their need to be regulated for accuracy. Whereas
typical commercial speech, such as advertising, is seen as less likely to
provoke public scrutiny and discussion, Nike and Martha Stewart were
responding as part of a public debate that was already ongoing. Their
statements were direct contributions to the interchange of ideas that was in
progress regarding their allegedly criminal activities. Undoubtedly, the
climate of public interest into which corporate criminal denials enter is
unique; Stewart's and Nike's statements peaked the public's interest like no
statement promoting household or sporting goods could. Such a context of
public interest and debate is one where the fitting remedy for "evil
counsels" should not be censorship or liability, but additional "good
counsels.' 178 Essentially, where speech is likely to garner public interest
and foster public debate, the truth or falsity of such speech should be
addressed through the scrutiny of a functioning marketplace of ideas; in the
mere advertising context, such a marketplace doesn't exist, prompting the
government to regulate the truth of commercial speech. Thus, the accuracy
rationale for regulating commercial speech should not apply to corporate
criminal denials.
b. The hardiness of commercial speech negates the danger from overregulation.
Statements like those made by Nike and Martha Stewart are not the
kind of "hardy" commercial speech that can withstand being crushed or
chilled by overbroad regulation. Rather, there is a great risk that corporate
denials will be completely chilled by the fear of liability under securities or
false advertising laws. 179 "Hardy" commercial speech is "the offspring of
economic self-interest.' ' 80 The denial of criminal allegations is not a hardy
178 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978) (stating that the adage
is ineffective as applied to mere advertisements, communications that are less public debate
and more one-way); see also supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
179 Nike, 539 U.S. at 680 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Uncertainty about how a court will
view these, or other, statements, can easily chill a speaker's efforts to engage in public
debate....").
1S0 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564
n.6 (1980). Yet any corporate act can be said to be in the corporation's economic selfinterest. If we are willing to define commercial speech so broadly, no statement by a
corporate actor or entity would receive First Amendment protection, a position rejected by
prior caselaw. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 766 (1978)
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form of speech in the vein of purely economic interests; rather, such speech
is a sensitive response to an attack on one's personal (or corporate)
innocence and autonomy. Because corporate denials at least possibly serve
non-economic goals, such as the simple desire to defend oneself against
criminal accusations, corporate denials are more sensitive to over-regulation
and more likely to be chilled than commercial, purely economic speech.
c. Commercial speech is considered less valuable'' and thus more
appropriately subject to regulation.
Where denials by commercial entities address an issue of ongoing
public debate, such speech is a valuable contribution to the forum of
ideas.' 82 The statements made by Stewart and Nike are distinguishable
from typical commercial speech, like product advertisements, because they
are speech on a matter of public concern. The intense media scrutiny and
repeated editorializing suggest that Nike's employment practices and
Stewart's involvement in the ImClone scandal were subjects in which the
public was interested. Particularly when made by highly public entities,
denials of criminal wrongdoing are properly classified as aids in the search
for truth83 and the advancement of self-expression, and should be valued
highly. 1
B. STRONG INTERESTS ARE PROTECTED BY PERMITTING
UNHAMPERED CORPORATE DENIAL OF PUBLIC CRIMINAL
ALLEGATIONS.
The type of expression exercised by Martha Stewart and Nike is of
high First Amendment value and is inconsistent with the low protection
afforded mere commercial speech. Typical commercial speech lacks the
communicative value of fully protected speech to both the speaker and
society. 184 Here, however, the interests of speaker, listeners, and society in
general suggest that such speech should be protected.

(protecting corporate speech in the form of political contributions as speech that "lies at the
heart of the First Amendment's protection").
""The value of corporate criminal denials is analyzed more thoroughly in Part IV.B,
infra.
182 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 350 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
("The commercial speech that this Court has permitted government to regulate or proscribe
was commercial speech that did not 'serve individual or societal interests in assuring
informed and reliable decision-making."'); see also supra notes 51-60 and accompanying
text.
183 Merrill, supra note 69, at 226.
184 Brief for the Petitioner at 14, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575).
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The right of a criminal defendant to deny allegations against him is a
speech right at the heart of the First Amendment, since it ensures complete
citizen autonomy, accords with constitutional protections afforded criminal
defendants, and protects against an overreaching government. The First
Amendment has been recognized as a crucial means of enforcement for
"constitutionally guaranteed and other rights."'' 85 An individual (or a
corporation) has a recognized interest in self-expression'1 6 that should
extend to the right to deny criminal allegations that serve to damage one's
public reputation. Self-expression, or contributing one's ideas to the public
debate of an issue, 187 seems particularly critical when the source of public
debate is the speaker herself. And when the debate concerns the speaker's
involvement in criminal activity, the interest in self-expression is even
higher, as criminality reflects extremely negatively upon both individual
and corporate defendants.
Further, a corporate speaker should have a right to deny the public
allegations made against him because silence in the face of public criticism
may signal acceptance of the allegations and imply guilt.'88 This runs
counter to the spirit of our constitutional protections for criminal
defendants, in particular the Fifth Amendment proscription of compelling a
witness to testify against himself.'8 9 In addition, in light of our nation's
criminal jurisprudence requiring that defendants are innocent until proven
guilty' 90 and the requirement of due process of law,' 9' any statement made
by a defendant or accused must be allowed full breathing space so as not to
be chilled. Particularly where the allegations are so highly publicized, the

185
186

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963).
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 534

n.2 (1980) (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 765 (1978)).
187 See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
188 This may be particularly true where the source of public criminal allegations is
respected, thus giving the allegations considerable credibility. This was a hazard faced by
Stewart, whose reported allegations came from congressional insiders. See supra notes 2526.
'89 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("Nor shall any person.., be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself ...").
190 United States v. Soto-Beniquez, 350 F.3d 131 (1st Cir. 2003) (recently reaffirming
this long-axiomatic right by holding that a not guilty plea is essentially a declaration of
innocence).
191 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("Nor shall any person ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law .... ). This provision has been interpreted as giving a
criminal defendant a right to present a defense.
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nearly reciprocal denial of such allegations, 192 as made by Martha Stewart
and Nike, must be protected to preserve the ability to deny criminal
allegations and assert, via the First Amendment, one's constitutional and
other rights.' 93 Without such protection, "profound reticence to speak on
social, political, or moral issues" would be consequentially
"instill[ed] in
94
commercial entities" facing criminal allegations.
Significantly, protection for criminal denials serves as a check on
government overreach, one of the significant interests served by the First
Amendment. "'The freedom of individuals to verbally oppose or challenge'
government action without criminal consequence 'is one of the principal
characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police
state." 9 5 A quintessential check on government overreach is the right of a
criminal defendant to rebut the charges of criminality and draw public
attention to the government's potentially arbitrary exertion of force over the
defendant.1 96 In particular, the government's imposition of liability or
criminality based on statements of defense seems like a precariously
slippery slope 97 that should be avoided altogether.
Listeners also have an interest in a corporate entity's statements of
defense, just as they have an interest in hearing any idea in the marketplace.
Modern First Amendment jurisprudence reflects the idea of a "free"
marketplace of ideas, where citizens benefit from having as much
information available to them as possible.'9 8 Just as a corporate defendant
has a particular interest in engaging in the public debate about her own
criminality, listeners have a heightened interest in hearing from the
defendant herself. Input from persons intimately involved in an issue of
public debate should be crucial to that debate.' 99 Regulation of speech on
matters of public importance is reminiscent of the social paternalism

192

For example, where public claims of criminal wrongdoing are in the form of "D is

guilty of crime X because of actions Y," a reciprocal denial would take the form of "D is not
guilty of crime X because of actions Z (not Y)."
193 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963).
194 Brief for the Petitioner at 41, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No.
02-575).
195 Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Martha Stewart's Omnibus Pre-Trial
Motions at 83, United States v. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 03 Crim.
717) (quoting City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,462-63 (1987)).
196 id.
197 Dennis & Boyden, supra note 8, at 5 (pithily noting that "Martha Stewart will have
her day in court, but she should not be forced to have another day in court for every previous
day").
198 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
199Bob Herbert, Editorial, Let Nike Stay in the Game, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2002, at A21.
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rejected by years of First Amendment interpretation.2 °0 Listeners should
receive information from both "sides" in the case of criminal
wrongdoing. 2 1 Allowing the accuser to speak, but requiring the accused to
remain silent or20 face
liability, may be misleading to consumers or investors
2
itself.
of
in and
While society has an interest in both the promulgation of
commercial 20 3 and noncommercial speech, this interest is at its peak when
the speech is noncommercial and on a matter of public concern. When
criminal allegations against a public figure become a matter of public
debate, a thriving marketplace of ideas requires permission to respond
without threat of liability, even if the response is false. The type of speech
that criminal allegations foster is the type of speech that puts a check on
government overreaching by questioning the sufficiency of the
government's claims. By limiting the types of speakers who can respond to
such allegations and instilling a fear of liability for denials, important
speech is chilled20 4 and critical First Amendment goals go underserved. °5
C. THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN REGULATING COMMERCIAL
ENTITIES' PUBLIC DENIALS IS LOW.
Furthermore, the government has a low interest in protecting
consumers or investors and has other means of regulating any potentially
harmful speech by commercial defendants. Because denials of criminal

200

Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575)

("If it were the state's role to assure that listeners reach the decision it regards as best
informed, in commerce or elsewhere, lessened First Amendment protection would
necessarily apply to [other types of speech as well].").
201 Dennis & Boyden, supra note 8, at 4.
202 Alan Reynolds, Martha Stewart: Obstructing Injustice, at http://www.cato.org/
dailys/06-28-03.html (June 28, 2003):
[Stewart's] statements about having made a December 20 agreement with her broker to sell at
$60 may or may not have been true. But they were not nearly as misleading to MSLO
stockholders as the false accusations of insider trading by "people close to a Congressional
investigation." The fact that MSLO fell from $19.01 on June 6 to $11.47 on June 28 shows that
congressional slander on June 6 really did mislead the markets while Martha Stewart's
countervailing efforts did not.

Id.
203

Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v.

Virginia, 425 U.S. 748, 748 (1976)) ("(S]ociety also has a strong interest in the free flow of
information, both because the efficient allocation of resources depends upon informed
consumer choices and because 'even an individual advertisement, though entirely
commercial,' may be of general public interest.").
204 Dennis & Boyden, supra note 8, at 4.
205See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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wrongdoing are viewed as de rigueur, such speech, even if false, should not
have much of an impact on the market. 0 6 Such speech may be disregarded
by consumers and investors as mere "puffery"; the listener may be better
informed of a statement's possible falsity and may even expect and question
the accuracy of a corporate defendants' denial.20 7 Thus, the government is
overly paternalistic when it "assume[s] that consumers lack the ability or
sophistication to decide for themselves whether a company's image reflects
reality,
or whether that image should influence their purchasing decisions at
all. , ,20 8
In addition, the government has other means of dealing with false
statements by corporate defendants. An obstruction of justice charge may
be brought to curtail or punish false statements made in the course of an
investigation. 0 9 In particular, Martha Stewart's later convictions, after the
charge of securities fraud was dismissed, prove that the government has
other avenues to successfully pursue that would accomplish its legitimate
goals. 1 o Further, false statements made in court can, of course, be punished
with a charge of perjury. 21 1 Lastly, if out-of-court public statements are
seen as potentially problematic, the court can issue a gag order preventing
all parties from issuing public1 2 statements, such that the public discourse
will not be unfairly one-sided.
V. CONCLUSION
Regulations imposed on speech on matters of public importance must
213
serve government interests that outweigh the interests being infringed.
Because the interests supporting a corporate entity's right to deny criminal
allegations are strong, and the government interest in regulating the content
of such statements is low, regulation of speech denying criminal allegations
violates the First Amendment. The state should not be able to impose a
financial disincentive or, even worse, the possibility of imprisonment, to
206
207

Dennis & Boyden, supra note 8, at 3.
Id. at 4 ("The securities laws presume that investors are able to dismiss 'puffery'-

vaguely optimistic statements about the future-and to anticipate obvious risks that are part
and parcel of the business they are investing in."). The same could be said of consumers
making purchasing decisions in response to defenses like that offered by Nike.
208 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575)
(citation omitted).
209 Dennis & Boyden, supra note 8, at 4.
210 See MarthaStewart Found Guilty on All Counts, supra note 42.
211 Id.
212 id.
213 See,

(1980).

e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530
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corporate actors who wish to respond to criminal allegations.2t 4 At the
least, criminal denials by commercial entities are comprised of both
commercial and noncommercial content, rendering them subject to analysis
as noncommercial speech. 1 5 If statements made by Nike and Martha
Stewart are classified as commercial speech (and thus receive lesser First
Amendment protection), commercial speakers will fear liability for making
any public statement denying criminal allegations. This type of speech,
however, should receive the utmost First Amendment protection given our
nation's emphasis on protections for criminal defendants and the high value
of speech that ensures against government overreach (here, in the decision
to prosecute or grant legislative permission for an individual to act as quasiprosecutor). 1 6 Criminal denials cannot be classified as purely commercial,
and the interests of society and of corporate speakers outweigh the
government's interest in regulating speech of this kind.
The exception proposed here is narrow, such that the risk of dilution of
other speech protections is low. Only where the corporate statement is a
public denial and refutation of criminal allegations should false or
misleading speech be insulated from regulation.21 7 The exception proposed
here does little to change prior decisions and allows for flexibility of speech
protection for an emerging class of highly public corporate criminal
defendants.
A corporate criminal defendant should not be denied the fundamental
protections our nation gives to all criminal defendants. By restricting the
speech a corporate actor can express, the state must be cautious not to
restrict any protected speech. The denial of criminal allegations is speech at
the heart of the First Amendment; such speech fosters citizen autonomy and
self-expression, as well as the more overarching marketplace of ideas.21 8
Further, such denials limit the reach of the government by opening up
government actions to public debate. Where, as in the context discussed
214

Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 664 (2003) ("Knowledgeable 'persons should be

free to participate in [a debate about important public issues] without fear of unfair reprisal.
The interest in protecting such participants from the chilling effect of the prospect of
expensive litigation is therefore also a matter of great importance."); see also supra notes 3844 (regarding Martha Stewart's defense of the criminal securities fraud charge). The fact
that this imbalance is felt solely by commercial entities under certain speech regulations
makes corporate speakers less likely to make statements on their own behalf than
private/individual criminal defendants who fear no such liability.
21 5 Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
216 The First Amendment is available to enforce these rights. NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963).
217 See supra note 192 for an example of the factually reciprocal type of criminal denial
that would be afforded protection under the exception proposed here.
218 See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
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here, the matter is already one of public debate because of the prominence
of the corporate defendant, restrictions on the defensive statements a
corporation can make limit unnecessarily the marketplace of ideas to a onesided debate.
The caution necessary to avoid suppressing protected speech requires
an exception to securities fraud, false advertising, or similar laws imposing
liability on corporate speakers in the limited context proposed here. Where
a corporate figure denies public allegations of criminal wrongdoing, such
speech should be protected under the First Amendment, even if factual
statements are false or misleading, to provide "breathing space" for highvalue criminal denials. Thus, the interest a criminal defendant has in
denying criminal allegations is a unique and narrow defense "so pure as to
countenance securities fraud," false advertising, or similar liability
stemming from public factual statements of defense. 1 9

219

Epstein, supra note I, at 59.
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